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Abstract
Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human
capital intensive industries? We present a model that may explain
this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ana-
lyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimes
when agents possess indispensable human capital. We show that the
larger the share of values that the agents can hold-up, the lower is the
implementable degree of peer dependent incentives. In a setting with
team e⁄ects ￿complementary tasks and peer pressure, respectively ￿
we show that while team-based incentives are optimal if agents are
dispensable, it may be costly, and in fact suboptimal, to provide team
incentives once the agents become indispensable.
JEL Classi￿cation: D23, J33, L14
Keywords: relational contracts; multiagent moral hazard; indispensable
human capital
1 Introduction
Firm value is increasingly dependent on human capital. The share of phys-
ical capital in publicly traded corporations has dramatically decreased the
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1last 30 years (see e.g. Blair and Kochan, 2000). At the same time we ob-
serve a higher degree of individual performance pay in modern corporations
(see e.g., Brown et al., 1998; Brown and Heywood, 2002, and Lemieux et
al., 2007). Are these trends related? Several studies indicate so. Long and
Shields (2005), Lemieux et al. (2007) and Henneberger et al. (2007) ￿nd
that individual performance pay is more likely to be found in ￿rms with
highly educated employees. A recent study by Barth et al. (2006) shows
that the frequency of group-based incentives is decreasing for those with
higher education, and increasing for blue-collar workers; while individual
performance pay is found to be strongly associated with ￿rms with a highly
educated workforce.1 Tremblay and Chenevert (2004) ￿nd that high-tech
￿rms are more likely to use individual performance pay, but not group pay,
and Grund and Sliwka (2007) ￿nd that individual performance appraisal,
such as performance pay, is more common at higher levels of organizations.
These studies are supported by research showing that the returns to skills
are increasing (see e.g. Junk et al. 1993). Human capital is to a larger
extent paid its marginal product, and individual performance pay is a way
to that (Lemieux et al. 2007). Group-based incentive schemes (as in part-
nerships), are still quite common in certain high-skilled professional service
industries such as law, accounting, investment banking and consulting, but
researchers have noted that there is a trend away from equal sharing part-
nerships towards productivity-based ￿ eat what you kill￿partnerships (Levin
and Tadelis, 2005).
One explanation for the increased use of individual performance pay is
that advances in information and communication technology has made it
easier to measure individual performance (Lemieux et al., 2007). A question
then is whether it is has become relatively more easy to asses the performance
of high-skilled workers. There is apparently no evidence that this is the case,
in fact, MacLeod and Parent (1999) ￿nd that incomplete incentive contracts
based on looser performance assessments are associated with complex jobs.
Barth et al. (2006) suggest that one should expect a positive relationship
between human capital and individual performance pay because the quality
and e⁄ort of high-skilled workers have larger impacts on productivity than
the quality and e⁄ort of other groups of workers. They lend support from
Brown (1990) who argues that in high-skilled jobs, worker output is more
sensitive to worker quality than in jobs requiring lower skills. Henneberger
et al. (2007) show that high-skilled workers tend to self-select into jobs
1In addition, several studies show that ￿rms with low union coverage are more willing
to use individualized incentive schemes (see e.g. Brown, 1990; Parent, 2002, Long and
Shields, 2005, Lemieux et al.), and union coverage is lower among high-skilled workers
(Acemoglu et al. 2001).
2with performance pay, supporting Lazear￿ s (1986) model. Along the same
line, studies by Kato (2002) and Torrington (1993) show that workers with
more education are particularly interested in receiving rewards tailored to
individual performance.
In our view, these are plausible explanations. However, there are some re-
maining puzzles. Individualized incentives are not desirable when teamwork
is important, or when it is di¢ cult to verify each worker￿ s contribution to
￿rm value, but it is hard to see that this applies less to high-skilled than to
low-skilled workers. In fact, several HR scholars have argued that knowledge
intensive organizations￿emphasis on innovation, teamwork and projects calls
for incentives that are group-based rather than based on individual perfor-
mance (see e.g. Balkin and Bannister, 1993). We should thus look for an
explanation saying that group-based incentives are desirable, but not feasi-
ble. Focusing on ￿rms￿inability to fully commit to incentive contracts, the
literature has pointed out that group-based incentive schemes are harder to
implement ￿and thus less feasible ￿than schemes based on relative perfor-
mance evaluation (Carmichael, 1983; Malcomson, 1984; Levin, 2002, Kvalły
and Olsen, 2006). In this paper we focus instead on the workers￿lack of
ability to commit to incentive contracts, which we believe is a central feature
of human capital intensive ￿rms, and show that this feature makes individual
performance pay easier to implement than most peer-dependent schemes.
We recognize here two features of human capital that necessitate a high
degree of individual performance pay. First, the true performance of high-
skilled workers is often di¢ cult to verify by third parties. Objective measures
of performance seldom exist, and even if they do, looser assessments of per-
formance also a⁄ect compensation (see e.g. MacLeod, 2003). Consequently,
incentive contracts specifying criteria for performance pay are seldom fully
protected by the court. This non-veri￿ability problem also applies to low-
skilled workers, but as noted above, incomplete incentive contracts are more
common in the high-skilled workforce. Second, human capital blurs the al-
location of ownership rights. According to the standard view of ownership,
it is the owner of an asset who has residual control rights; that is ￿the right
to decide all usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with a prior
contract, custom or law￿(Hart, 1995). If the asset involved in the worker￿ s
production is his own mind and knowledge, then he is also to decide all
non-contractual usages. An indispensable ￿ knowledge worker￿can therefore
threaten to walk away with ideas, clients, techniques etcetera. As noted by
Liebeskind (2000), human-capital-intensive ￿rms must induce their employ-
ees to stay around long enough so that the ￿rm can establish some intellectual
property rights with respect to the ideas generated by these employees, or
else these ￿rms run the risk of being expropriated or held-up by their own
3employees.
Why do these two features - incomplete contracts and indispensable hu-
man capital - prepare the way for individual performance pay? In other
words: Why is it di¢ cult to implement peer-dependent incentives when per-
formance is unveri￿able and workers possess residual control rights? The
answer is intuitive when we think of the incentives facing an agent who is a
full residual claimant. He simply gets the values he has produced; the market
incentives are not linked to what other agents produce. Hence, if a principal
wants to implement a peer-dependent incentive contract, she faces a problem
if her agents have residual control rights. With relative performance evalua-
tion (RPE) an agent is not paid well if his peer performs better, while with
joint performance evaluation (JPE) he is not paid well if his peer￿ s perfor-
mance is poor. This peer-dependence may lead to contract breach: an agent
who is paid a low bonus after realizing a high output, has incentives to hold-
up his output and renegotiate payments. Of course, a hold-up strategy is
only possible if the agent actually is able to prevent the principal from real-
izing the agent￿ s value added ex post production. But if hold-up is possible,
then RPE and JPE schemes are more susceptible to hold-up than incentive
schemes based on independent performance evaluation (IPE).
The parties can mitigate the hold-up problem through repeated interac-
tion, i.e. through self-enforcing relational contracting where contract breach
is punished, not by the court, but by the parties who can refuse to cooperate
after a deviation.2 But since a hold-up will be regarded as a deviation from
such a relational contract, the self-enforcing range of the contract is limited
by the hold-up problem. And since the hold-up problem is most severe under
joint or relative performance evaluation, we can expect a larger fraction of
independent performance pay when hold-up is feasible for the agents.
Is this a problem? Yes, from the informativeness principle (Holmstr￿m,
1979, 1982), we know that an incentive contract should be based on all vari-
ables that provide information about the agents￿actions. Stochastic and/or
technological dependences between the agents then typically call for peer-
dependent incentive schemes. By tying compensation to an agent￿ s relative
performance, the principal can ￿lter out common noise so that compensation
is based more on real e⁄ort, and less on random shocks that are outside the
agent￿ s control (see Holmstr￿m, 1982; and Mookherjee, 1984).3 And by tying
2In￿ uential models of relatonal contracts include Klein and Le› er (1981), Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), Bull (1987) and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994, 2002). MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989) generalize the case of symmetric information, while Levin (2003)
makes a general treatment of relational contracts with asymmetric information, allowing
for incentive problems due to moral hazard and hidden information.
3See also Lazear and Rosen (1981) Nalebu⁄ and Stiglitz (1983) and Green and Stokey
4compensation to the joint performance of a team of agents, the principal can
exploit complementarities between the agents￿e⁄orts.4
Hence, from the informativeness principle it is puzzling that we actu-
ally observe incentive schemes based on independent performance evaluation.
The drawbacks of JPE and RPE can partly explain it: JPE may be suscepti-
ble to free-riding (see e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; and Holmstr￿m, 1982),
while RPE is susceptible to collusion (see e.g. Mookherjee, 1984). RPE may
also induce sabotage and discourage cooperation (see Lazear, 1995, for a
discussion of the costs and bene￿ts of RPE and JPE).
In this paper we provide a new argument for independent performance
evaluation; an argument that is not based on these classical drawbacks, but
rather on the implementability of peer-dependent incentives. Our main result
then says that the maximum dependence between agent i￿ s bonus and agent
j￿ s output that the principal can implement, decreases with the share of
values that the agents can hold-up ex post. This result is robust to settings
with both stochastic and technological dependence (team e⁄ects) between
the agents.
With respect to team e⁄ects we consider two cases: complementary tasks
and peer pressure. We show that a stark JPE contract is optimal only if
the agents￿hold-up power is su¢ ciently low. In the case of complementary
tasks, the optimal implementable scheme becomes less based on JPE and
more based on IPE the larger the share of values the agents can hold-up, and
in the case of peer pressure, any JPE scheme becomes suboptimal once the
relational contract constraints bind.
Broadly speaking, our contribution is to consider the e⁄ect of residual
control rights in a multiagent moral hazard model. In the vast literature on
multiagent moral hazard it is (implicitly) assumed that residual control rights
are exclusively in the hands of the principal. And in the literature dealing
with optimal allocation of control rights, the multiagent moral hazard prob-
lem is scantily considered. 5 Our paper also contributes to the literature by
(1983) for analyses of RPE￿ s special form, rank-order tournaments.
4In addition, JPE can promote cooperation since an agent is rewarded if his peers
perform well (see e.g. Holmstr￿m and Milgrom, 1990; Itoh 1993; and Macho-Stadler and
Perez-Castrillo, 1993). JPE can also provide implicit incentives not to shirk (or exert low
e⁄ort), since shirking may have social costs (as in Kandel and Lazear, 1992), or induce
other agents to shirk, which again reduces the shirking agent￿ s expected compensation (as
in Che and Yoo, 2001).
5This literature begins with Grossman and Hart, 1986; and Hart and More,1990 who
analyze static relationships. Repeated relationships are analyzed in particular by Halonen,
2002; and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002.
Although Hart and Moore (1990) analyze a model with many agents, they do not con-
sider the classical moral hazard problem that we address, where a principal can only
5introducing other-regarding preferences and team technology in a relational
contracting set-up.
Our basic set-up with two agents, binary e⁄ort and binary output is
similar to Che and Yoo (2001). As shown by these authors, peer monitor-
ing is a rationale for making use of peer-dependent incentives such as JPE.
We introduce and explore instead technological complementarities and peer
pressure in this setting. And more importantly, we extend and complement
their analysis by assuming non-veri￿able output, and that agents are able to
hold-up values ex post.6
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section
3 deduces the optimal relational incentive contract in a simple setting with
stochastic and technological independence. In Section 4 we analyze the e⁄ect
of complementary tasks, common noise and peer pressure, while Section 5
o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an economic environment consisting of one principal and two iden-
tical agents (i = 1;2) who each period produce either high, QH, or low, QL,
values for the principal. Each agent￿ s e⁄ort level can be either high or low,
where high e⁄ort has a disutility cost of c and low e⁄ort is costless. The
principal can only observe the realization of the agents￿output, not the level
of e⁄ort they choose. Similarly, agent i can only observe agent j￿ s output
(i 6= j; j = 1;2), not his e⁄ort level.7 Moreover, we assume that output
is non-veri￿able to a third party. Hence, contracts on output cannot be
enforced by the court.
The agents￿outputs depend on e⁄orts and noise. Like Che and Yoo
(2001), we assume that a favorable shock occurs with probability ￿ 2 (0;1), in
which case both agents succeed in producing high values for the principal. If
the shock is unfavorable, the agents￿outputs are stochastically independent,
and each agent￿ s success probability depends on the agent￿ s own as well as
his peer￿ s e⁄ort. Let q(￿;￿) denote this probability, where ￿ 2 fH;Lg and
￿ 2 fH;Lg refer to the agent￿ s own and his peer￿ s e⁄ort, respectively. We
observe a noisy measure of the agents￿e⁄ort.
6Kvalły and Olsen (2007) consider a model on cooperation (help) between agents with
hold-up power, while Kvalły and Olsen (2008) endogenize the agent￿ s hold-up power in a
simpler model with no team e⁄ects.
7Whether or not the agents can observe each others e⁄ort level is not decisive for the
analysis presented. However, by assuming that e⁄ort is unobservable among the agents,
we do not need to model repeated peer-monitoring.
6assume that there are three levels of the success probability for each agent:
q(H;H) = qH (1)
q(H;L) = qHL
q(L;H) = q(L;L) = qL, where qL ￿ qHL ￿ qH, qL < qH:
The idea here is that the peer￿ s e⁄ort has a positive e⁄ect when the agent￿ s
own e⁄ort is high, but has no e⁄ect when own e⁄ort is low. Note also that
qHL = qH corresponds to no team e⁄ects (independent technology), while
qHL = qL corresponds to perfect complementarity.
Throughout the paper we assume that the value of high e⁄ort exceeds its
cost, in the sense that
(1 ￿ ￿)￿q￿Q > c, (2)
where ￿q = qH ￿ qL and ￿Q = QH ￿ QL. It is moreover assumed that all
parties are risk neutral, but that the agents are subject to limited liability:
the principal cannot impose negative wages.8 Ex ante reservation wages are
assumed to be zero, for convenience.
The principal may o⁄er each agent a wage contract saying that agent i









LL) ex post value realizations, where
the subscripts refer to agent i and agent j￿ s realizations of Qk and Ql, (k;l =
H;L), respectively. (We mostly suppress agent notation in superscripts since
the agents are identical.) For each agent, a wage scheme exhibits joint (JPE),
relative (RPE) or independent (IPE) performance evaluation if, respectively,
(￿HH;￿LH) > (￿HL;￿LL)9, (￿HH;￿LH) < (￿HL;￿LL), and (￿HH;￿LH) =
(￿HL;￿LL). With JPE an agent is paid more if his peer does well, in RPE he is
paid more if his peer does poorly, and in IPE his payment is independent of his
peer￿ s performance. Since outputs are not veri￿able, a contract must be self-
enforcing to be sustainable. We now describe the contracting environment
in more detail.
Each period the principal and the agents face the following contracting
situation.










LL) conditional on outputs as described above.
2. The agents simultaneously choose e⁄orts. Provided the contract is
8Limited liability may arise from liquidity constraints or from laws that prohibit ￿rms
from extracting payments from workers.
9The inequality means weak inequality of each component and strict inequality for at
least one component.




HH + (1 ￿ ￿)fq(￿;￿)q(￿;￿)￿
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LH + (1 ￿ q(￿;￿))(1 ￿ q(￿;￿))￿
i
LLg(3)
where ￿ and ￿ denote, respectively, agent i￿ s and agent j￿ s e⁄orts, ￿;￿ 2
fH;Lg.
3. The agents￿value realizations, Qk and Ql, (k;l = H;L), are revealed.
The principal decides whether or not to honor the contract.
4. If the principal reneges on the contract by refusing to pay ￿
i, she
bargains with the agent and pays a spot price si for the good. If the principal
honors the contract, the agent chooses whether or not to accept the payment
￿
i. If he accepts, trade takes place according to the contract. If not, he
bargains with the principal and obtains a spot price si.
We assume that the spot price is determined by Nash bargaining. In stage
4 agent i is able to independently attain ￿Qk, ￿ 2 [0;1] in an alternative
market. In Nash bargaining, agent i will then receive ￿Qk plus a share ￿
of the surplus from trade i.e. si = sk = ￿Qk + ￿(Qk ￿ ￿Qk) = ￿Qk where
￿ = ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿). The agent￿ s total hold-up power (￿) is then an increasing
function of ex post bargaining power, ￿, and ex post outside options, ￿. The
outside option parameter ￿ depends on the speci￿city of the agent￿ s value-
added. The more ￿rm speci￿c value-added ￿or the more narrow the agent￿ s
skill set ￿the lower is ￿. But, importantly, note that even if ￿ = 0, the agent
can still achieve a share ￿ = ￿ ex post. This share ￿ of the surplus from trade
is determined by ex post bargaining power, and will typically increase with
the indispensability of the agents: If agents possess essential human capital
that makes them indispensable for ex post value extraction, then ￿ is high.
But if values accrue directly to the principal in the process of production,
then the agents have no hold-up power: ￿ = ￿ = 0, so that ￿ = 0. So to
obtain a positive spot price, the agents must be able to hold up values in
stage 3.10
10It should be noted that the ability to hold-up values rests on the assumption that
agents become indispensable in the process of production (as in e.g. Halonen, 2002). We
do not analyze the incentives to invest in ￿rm-speci￿c human capital (as in e.g Kessler and
L￿lfesmann, 2006). Rather, we just assume that agents become indispensable ex post, and
then focus on how this a⁄ects the multiagent moral hazard problem. We thus follow the
relational contracting literature, and abstract from human capital accumulation. The level
of ￿Qi and ￿Qi is therefore assumed to be exogenously given and constant each period.
This also allows us to concentrate on stationary relational contracts, where the principal
promises the same contingent compensation in each period.
82.1 The spot contract
A spot contract is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) of the contracting game
described above. In stage 4, agent i will renege if his promised bonus for the
given outputs is lower than the spot price (￿
i
kl < sk), and honor otherwise.
In stage 3, the principal will renege if ￿
i
kl > sk, and honor otherwise. Hence,
at least one party will renege, unless ￿
i
kl = sk. The only payment that
can be implemented for agent i when he has output Qk is thus sk = ￿Qk.
Anticipating this, agent i will in stage 2 exert low e⁄ort if the cost of high
e⁄ort exceeds the higher expected spot price induced by this e⁄ort, i.e. if
c > (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (q(H;￿) ￿ q(L;￿))￿Q. Recalling our assumptions (1) we see
that low e⁄ort is thus a strictly dominant strategy if
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿q￿Q < c (4)
where ￿q = qH ￿ qL. Hence, we see that the spot contracting game has
a unique continuation equilibrium from stage 2 if (4) holds11. Each agent
then exerts low e⁄ort and receives the expected spot price E(s) = ￿(QL +
(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)qL)￿Q). If (4) does not hold, there is an equilibrium where
each agent exerts high e⁄ort and receives the expected spot price E(s) =
￿(QL + (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)qH)￿Q).
In our simple model, a contract to motivate high e⁄ort is only necessary
if the parameters satisfy (4), since if not, the agents￿hold-up power provides
them with su¢ cient incentives. Hence, throughout the paper we assume that
(4) holds, so that the principal has to implement an incentive contract in
order to induce high e⁄ort. Since outputs are non-veri￿able, such a contract
must be self-enforcing.
2.2 Relational contracts
For the principal to implement high e⁄ort through a contract, ￿, the contract
must be incentive compatible (IC) and self-enforcing, where a self-enforcing
(relational) contract is a PPE of the in￿nitely repeated game in which the
stage game described above is played every period. We consider ￿rst the IC
constraint.
An implementable incentive scheme, ￿, is incentive compatible if
￿(H;H;￿) ￿ c ￿ ￿(L;H;￿) (5)
11If there are team e⁄ects, low e⁄ort by both agents is a continuation equilibrium in
stage 2 if the weaker condition (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (qHL ￿ qL)￿Q < c holds. In that case, if (1 ￿
￿)￿ (qHL ￿ qL)￿Q < c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (qH ￿ qL)￿Q, there are two e⁄ort equilibria, namely
HH and LL.
9The left hand side (LHS) shows the expected wage minus the cost from
exerting high e⁄ort, while the right hand side (RHS) shows the expected wage
from exerting low e⁄ort. The condition (5) ensures that high e⁄ort from both
agents is an equilibrium, given the contract ￿. The agents￿equilibrium is
unique if high e⁄ort is a dominant strategy, i.e. if ￿(H;L;￿)￿c ￿ ￿(L;L;￿)
holds in addition to (5). The optimal wage schemes we deduce in this paper
will ensure either a unique high-e⁄ort equilibrium, or a high-e⁄ort equilibrium
that is not Pareto dominated by a low-e⁄ort equilibrium.
Consider now the conditions for the incentive contract to be self-enforcing,
i.e. the conditions for implementing a relational incentive contract. The
relational incentive contract is self-enforcing if all parties honor the contract
for all possible values of Qk and Ql, k;l 2 fL;Hg. As in e.g. Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy (2002), we analyze trigger strategy equilibria in which
the parties enter into spot contracting forever after one party reneges. We
consider a multilateral punishment structure where any deviation by the
principal triggers low e⁄ort from both agents. The principal honors the
contract only if both agents honored the contract in the previous period.
The agents honor the contract only if the principal honored the contract
with both agents in the previous period. Thus, if the principal reneges on
the relational contract, both agents insist on spot contracting forever after.
And vice versa: if one of the agents (or both) renege, the principal insists
on spot contracting forever after. A natural explanation for this is that the
agents interpret a unilateral contract breach (i.e. the principal deviates from
the contract with only one of the agents) as evidence that the principal is
not trustworthy (see Bewley, 1999, and Levin, 2002).12
Now, (given that (5) holds) the principal will honor the contract if, for
all realizations of output Qk;Ql, k;l 2 fH;Lg, we have
￿￿kl ￿ ￿lk +
2￿
1 ￿ ￿
[QL + (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)qH)￿Q ￿ ￿(H;H;￿)] (EP)
￿ ￿￿(Ql + Qk) +
2￿
1 ￿ ￿
[QL + (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)qL)￿Q ￿ E(s)];
where ￿ is a common discount factor. The LHS of the inequality shows the
principal￿ s expected present value from honoring the contract, which involves
paying out the promised bonuses and then receiving the value associated with
high e⁄ort in all future periods. The RHS shows the expected present value
from reneging, which involves spot trading of the realized outputs, and then
receiving the value associated with low e⁄ort and spot trading in all future
12Modelling multilateral punishments is also done for convenience. Bilateral punish-
ments will not alter our results qualitatively.
10periods.







E(s), all k;l 2 fH;Lg (EA)
where similarly the LHS shows the agent￿ s expected present value from
honoring the contract, while the RHS shows the expected present value from
reneging.
3 Independent tasks
In order to highlight the main result from the model in the simplest possible
setting, we ￿rst consider the case of stochastic and technological indepen-
dence, i.e. ￿ = 0 and qHL = qH. The more general set-up is analyzed in the
next section.
In this setting the IC condition (5) for high e⁄ort from each agent takes
the following form:




The optimal contract minimizes the associated expected wage costs ￿(H;H;￿),
subject to the constraints given by limited liability, incentive compatibility
(IC), and enforceability (EP and EA). By IC and the de￿nition (3) of the
wage cost, we have for ￿ = ￿(H;H;￿):




+ qH￿LH + (1 ￿ qH)￿LL:
From this inequality and limited liability (￿LH;￿LL ￿ 0), we see that the
least cost contract satisfying IC has ￿LH = ￿LL = 0 and yields a per agent
wage cost ￿m = qH
c
￿q. Such a contract would always be feasible, and hence
optimal, if outputs were veri￿able.
Such a contract will also satisfy the agent￿ s enforceability conditions EA
when the hold-up parameter ￿ is small, but generally not so when ￿ is ￿ large￿ .
(The RHS of EA is increasing in ￿.) Inserting for EA (applied to ￿LH and







[E(s) ￿ ￿ + c]
11Collecting terms involving ￿ and substituting for the expected spot price








Since IC and limited liability (￿LH;￿LL ￿ 0) implies ￿ ￿ qH
c
￿q, we see




+ maxf0;￿QL ￿ ￿(
c
￿q
￿ ￿￿Q)qLg = ￿min (8)
The last term in ￿min re￿ ects the in￿ uence of the enforceability conditions
(EA) for the agent. (We will check the corresponding conditions for the
principal (EP) below). When the last term in ￿min is positive, it is impossible
to implement and enforce a relational contract where the agent is paid ￿LH =
￿LL = 0 for a low outcome, and the wage cost for the principal will therefore
exceed the cost for the case ￿ = 0. Higher wages ease implementation by
making it less tempting for the agents to renege on the contract.
The additional cost is increasing in ￿, the share of the value that the
agent can hold-up ex post. The cost is naturally decreasing in ￿, since higher
discount factors ease implementation. We will here restrict attention to cases
where the hold-up problem is serious in the sense that the cost is positive for
all ￿ < 1. This will be the case when the hold-up parameter ￿ is su¢ ciently
large, more precisely when it satis￿es13






The derivation of the lower bound ￿min above shows that in order to
minimize the additional cost associated with the self-enforcement constraint,
EA, the principal must set ￿LH = ￿LL, i.e. ensure that an agent￿ s pay for low
output is independent of the other agent￿ s output. The ￿ ￿xed wage￿associated
with these outcomes (￿LH = ￿LL) generates the additional cost term in the
expression for ￿min, and hence we have (for ￿ > ￿0):
￿LH = ￿LL = ￿QL ￿ ￿(
c
￿q
￿ ￿￿Q)qL > 0 (10)
Since the enforceability constraint (EA) is binding for these two bonuses,
it follows that we can write this constraint for the other bonuses in the
13Note that ￿0￿q￿Q < c, so (4) is not violated, given that ￿ = 0 here.
12following form:
￿Hl ￿ ￿￿Q ￿ ￿LH = ￿LL, l = H;L (EA￿ )
This relation says that the bonus increments for high output ￿HH ￿ ￿LH
and ￿HL ￿￿LL must both exceed ￿￿Q, which is the additional value of high
output for the agent outside the relationship. At the same time the bonuses
must be incentive compatible with high e⁄ort, and to minimize costs they
must satisfy IC with equality, which is to say that we must have




Note that an IPE scheme with ￿Hl ￿ ￿Ll = c
￿q will certainly ful￿ll both
constraints EA￿and IC￿ , given that we have assumed c
￿q > ￿￿Q, see (4).
The constraints imply that to generate minimal costs and be implementable a
scheme cannot deviate too much from IPE. Figure 1 provides an illustration.
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The ￿gure depicts the IC constraint and the reduced form dynamic en-
forceability constraints for the agents (EA￿ ) as functions of the bonus incre-
ments ￿HL￿￿LL and ￿HH ￿￿LH (where ￿LH = ￿LL). Here points above, on
and below the diagonal represent, respectively, JPE, IPE and RPE contracts.
The ￿gure illustrates that only a limited set of contracts on IC satis￿es the
agents￿enforceability constraints.
13To be fully feasible a contract must also satisfy the dynamic enforceability
constraint for the principal (EP). As we demonstrate in the appendix, this
constraint can here be written as





This reduced form EP constraint can be represented as the curve marked
EP￿in Figure 1. The curve has a kink at ￿HH ￿￿LH = 1
2(￿HL￿￿LL+￿￿Q),
and its position depends on ￿. For given bonuses, the constraint requires that
the discount factor ￿ must be su¢ ciently large to guarantee implementability.
Conversely, for given ￿ the constraint limits the set of bonuses that can be
implemented; in particular we see that the bonus increments ￿Hl￿￿Ll cannot
be too large.






￿q(2 ￿ qH) (11)
we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) For ￿ ￿ ￿0 and ￿ ￿ b ￿ a wage scheme satisfying (10), IC￿ ,
EA￿and EP￿is optimal. The minimal wage cost is given by ￿min, and any
other implementable wage scheme yields a higher cost. (ii) No wage scheme
yielding high e⁄ort can be implemented for ￿ < b ￿
Remark. In the appendix we verify that the optimal wage schemes
ensure either a unique high-e⁄ort equilibrium (for RPE schemes), or a high-
e⁄ort equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated by a low-e⁄ort equilibrium
(for JPE or IPE schemes). Moreover, we show that these schemes satisfy the
following conditions
￿(H;H;￿) ￿ c ￿ E(s) (12)
￿q￿Q ￿ ￿(H;H;￿) ￿ E(s) (13)
The ￿rst shows that the agents￿expected payment from the incentive
contract exceeds the expected spot price, and the second shows that the
principal￿ s expected surplus from the contract exceeds the surplus from spot
contracting. All parties are therefore better o⁄ with the relational contract
than with a spot contract.
Proposition 1 shows that an optimal wage scheme satis￿es IC and is
bounded by the dynamic implementability constraints EA￿and EP￿ . Consider
now variations in ￿. As ￿ increases (for ￿ ￿xed), the curve representing
14EA￿in Figure 1 moves outwards along the 45 degree line with the EP￿ -curve
￿ attached to it￿ . The IC curve remains ￿xed, and thus a smaller set of bonuses
remains admissible. Hence, the agents￿ability to hold-up values ex post
calls for incentive schemes that come close to schemes based on independent
performance evaluation. We have:
Proposition 2 The maximum dependence between agent i￿ s bonus and agent
j￿ s output that the principal can implement, decreases with the share of values,
￿, that the agents can hold-up. In particular, for an optimal and feasible
wage scheme, we have ￿LH = ￿LL and j￿HH ￿ ￿HLj ￿ ( c
￿q ￿￿￿Q)m, where
m = maxf 1
qH; 1
1￿qHg
Note that for a su¢ ciently large ￿ only IPE remains feasible, since j￿HH ￿ ￿HLj !
0 as ￿ ! c
￿q￿Q. Finally note also that a higher ￿ eases implementation of
high e⁄ort. This is seen in the expression for the critical factor b ￿, which
shows that b ￿ ! 0 as ￿ ! c
￿q￿Q.
Proposition 2 highlights how agent hold-up a⁄ects the implementability
of peer dependent incentives. An agent who realizes a high output, but is
paid a low bonus only because his peer performs better (RPE) or worse
(JPE), has incentives to hold-up his output and renegotiate payments. This
obstructs the implementation of relational incentive contracts.
In the simple setting presented in this section, there is no inherent reason
for the principal to o⁄er peer-dependent incentives, since IPE, RPE and JPE
are equally pro￿table. However, once we allow for technological or stochastic
dependence between the agents￿tasks, RPE or JPE become desirable. But
as we shall see in the next section, even if peer-dependent incentives become
desirable, the basic insight from Proposition 2 remains valid, and implies
that the most desirable schemes may well not be implementable.
4 Team incentives
We will now demonstrate the importance of agent-hold up in a setting where
there are team e⁄ects. Such e⁄ects can take many forms; here we analyze
two cases: Complementary tasks and peer pressure.
4.1 Complementary tasks
Consider now the general formulations (1) - (3) incorporating complementary
tasks and common noise. For expositional simplicity we will assume perfect
15complementarity, so that high e⁄ort from one agent is productive only if the
other agent also exerts high e⁄ort, and thus
q(H;H) = qH > qL = q(H;L) = q(L;H) = q(L;L)
In this setting we have:




H￿HH + qH(1 ￿ qH)(￿HL + ￿LH) + (1 ￿ qH)
2￿LL
￿




L￿HH + qL(1 ￿ qL)(￿HL + ￿LH) + (1 ￿ qL)
2￿LL
￿
To illustrate the forces at play here, consider ￿rst three ￿ extreme￿con-
tracts; a stark JPE scheme (￿HH;0;0;0), a pure IPE scheme (￿;￿;0;0) and
a stark RPE scheme (0;￿HL;0;0). In all contracts an agent is paid a bonus
only if he has a success. The JPE (RPE) contract pays the bonus when the
success occurs together with a success (failure) by the other agent, while in
the IPE contract the payment is independent of the other agent￿ s outcome.
We will now show that if we ignore enforceability conditions, the least cost
contract is either the stark JPE scheme or the stark RPE scheme. We will
then show that (i) while these contracts can be feasible (enforceable) when
the agents￿hold-up power is su¢ ciently small, they become unfeasible when
this hold-up power exceeds some threshold, and (ii) that the optimal contract
then moves towards an IPE scheme as the hold-up power increases beyond
the threshold.
For the JPE scheme (￿HH;0;0;0), the IC constraint ￿(H;H;￿) ￿ c ￿
￿(L;H;￿) yields (1 ￿ ￿)(q2
H ￿ q2










L. For the IPE scheme the IC constraint yields







while for the RPE scheme the IC constraint yields (1 ￿ ￿)(qH ￿ qL)(1 ￿
qH ￿ qL)￿HL ￿ c and thus expected costs ￿R = qH(1 ￿ qH) c
(qH￿qL)(1￿qH￿qL)
(assuming 1 ￿ qH ￿ qL > 0). The RPE contract here ￿lters out the common
noise factor, and yields a cost that is completely independent of this factor.
Comparing the three contracts, we see that for ￿ = 0 the JPE contract
yields the lowest cost, and that we then have ￿J < ￿I < ￿R. For ￿ close
to 1, on the other hand, the RPE contract yields the lowest cost. Indeed,
(assuming 1 ￿ qH ￿ qL > 0) there is critical ^ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that for ￿ < ^ ￿
we have ￿J < ￿I < ￿R, while for ￿ > ^ ￿ we have ￿J > ￿I > ￿R. The
critical ^ ￿ is given by the condition ￿J = ￿R, which after a little algebra
yields ^ ￿ =
qHqL
(1￿qH)(1￿qL).
The reason behind these results are as follows: When tasks are comple-
ments, low e⁄ort from agent i yields a negative externality on agent j. With
JPE, the agent is punished for this, i.e. JPE internalizes the externality to
16some extent. If there is no or little common noise (￿ < ^ ￿), this makes it less
costly to implement high e⁄ort under JPE than under IPE or RPE. Indeed,
the stark JPE scheme will then, if it is feasible, dominate all other schemes.
But the JPE scheme, which pays out bonuses when both agents have high
outputs, is vulnerable to common shocks. So when the common noise factor
is su¢ ciently large (￿ > ^ ￿) this scheme is dominated by the RPE scheme,
which here is immune to such shocks. Thus we see that there is a tension
here between (i) using JPE to internalize the externality induced by the com-
plementarity between tasks, and (ii) using RPE to ￿lter out and neutralize
the e⁄ect of the common shocks.
This can be illustrated by Figure 2, which is similar to Figure 1. (The
position of the IC constraint will be di⁄erent from that in Figure 1 due to
the complementarity and noise factors.) The three contracts discussed above
are here represented by points J, I, and R, respectively. The dotted lines are
iso-cost lines for the principal. Their slope depend on ￿, and the critical value
^ ￿ is precisely the value for which they are parallel to the IC line. For ￿ < ^ ￿
the iso-cost lines are steeper than the IC line, as indicated in the ￿gure. It
is clear from the ￿gure that the JPE contract then yields a lower cost than
the two other contracts. It is also clear that for the opposite case ￿ > ^ ￿
the lowest cost will be obtained by the RPE contract, since the iso-cost lines
then are less steep than the IC line.
LH HH b b -












Regarding enforceability, we see by checking the EA constraints that the
three contracts do satisfy these constraints if the agents have no hold-up
17power (since the RHS of EA is zero for ￿ = 0). Checking the EP constraints,
we see that the three contracts also satisfy these for ￿ = 0, provided the
discount factor ￿ is su¢ ciently close to 1. This implies that each of these
contracts is enforceable if the agents￿hold-up power is su¢ ciently small (￿
close to zero), and ￿ is su¢ ciently close to 1. Intuitively, each contract gives
both agents a rent (￿i￿c > 0), and for ￿ small no agent can gain by reneging.
Also, each contract gives the principal a surplus exceeding her spot surplus
for ￿ small (one can check that (1 ￿ ￿)￿q￿Q ￿ ￿i > 0), and hence neither
the principal has incentives to renege when future surpluses are su¢ ciently
important for her (￿ is large).
The stark JPE or RPE contracts discussed above will, however, typically
not be feasible when the agents￿hold-up power (￿) is ￿ large￿ , since they will
then typically violate the agents￿enforceability constraints (EA). As we will
show below, these constraints can be represented by lines such as EA￿in
Figure 2. This is similar to the independence case illustrated in Figure 1,
and we will see that the principal￿ s constraints (EP) can be represented in a
similar way as well. The unique optimal contract for the case illustrated in
Figure 2 (￿ < ^ ￿) will then be the contract given by the north-west intersec-
tion point of IC and EA￿ . This is a JPE contract, but it is less stark than the
JPE contract discussed above. As ￿ increases, the principal will be forced to
move the contract in the direction of the 45 degree line, and hence move it
towards an IPE contract.
Proceeding to the formal analysis, note that the IC constraint ￿(H;H;￿)￿
c ￿ ￿(L;H;￿), can here be written:




where ￿q = qH ￿qL. Consider ￿rst the case ￿ < ^ ￿ =
qHqL
(1￿qH)(1￿qL). Substitut-
ing for ￿HH from the IC constraint (ICt) into the expression for ￿(H;H;￿)
we obtain the following inequality (see the appendix)
￿ ￿ ￿J +
p
2
(￿HL + ￿LH) + (1 ￿ p)￿LL, (14)
where
￿J =







and p = 2
qHqL ￿ ￿(1 ￿ qH)(1 ￿ qL)
qH + qL
2 (0;qH)
We recognize ￿J as the cost associated with the stark JPE contract discussed
above. The inequality in (14) shows that this is the lowest cost to implement
18high e⁄ort, subject to limited liability. But for ￿ > 0 the bonuses must also
satisfy the enforceability conditions. Using EA for ￿HL;￿LH;￿LL in (14) now
yields (see the appendix):
￿ ￿ ￿J +
p
2
￿￿Q + ￿(￿;￿) = ￿m(￿;￿) (15)
where






￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)q2
L
qH + qL
As in Section 3, we will also here restrict attention to cases where the hold-up
problem is serious in the sense that ￿m(￿;￿) > ￿J for all ￿ < 1. This will
occur when the hold-up parameter ￿ exceeds some threshold. De￿ne ￿1 as
the smallest value of ￿ that makes the expression for ￿(￿;￿) positive for all








Reasoning as in the previous section we then obtain the following result (see
the appendix):
Lemma 1 For ￿ < ^ ￿ =
qHqL
(1￿qH)(1￿qL) we have: For ￿ ￿ ￿1 the minimal wage
cost subject to IC and EA is given by ￿m(￿;￿). This is attained when IC
binds, and when EA binds for ￿HL;￿LH;￿LL. The unique bonuses are given
by






￿ ￿￿Q) > ￿HL = ￿LL + ￿￿Q,
￿LH = ￿LL = ￿(￿;￿) (16)
Remark. In the appendix we show that the optimal wage scheme given
in the lemma ensures a high-e⁄ort equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated
by a low-e⁄ort equilibrium.
The given wage scheme is JPE, but has a less stark form than the optimal
scheme for veri￿able output. And we see that the larger is the agent￿ s ex
post share ￿, the closer the scheme is to an IPE scheme; speci￿cally we see
that ￿HH ￿ ￿HL ! 0 as ￿ ! c
(1￿￿)￿q￿Q. Note moreover that, since EA is
14￿ > ￿1 is su¢ cient, but not strictly necessary for ￿m(￿;￿) > ￿J. We restrict attention
to ￿ > ￿1 to simplify the exposition.
19binding for ￿LH and ￿LL, the EA constraints for the other bonuses take the
form ￿Hl ￿ ￿Ll ￿ ￿￿Q, and these constraints can hence be represented as
indicated in Figure 2. For the same reason the EP constraints can also be
represented as indicated in that ￿gure.
To be implementable, a wage scheme must also satisfy EP. We show in
the appendix that the scheme given in Lemma 3 satis￿es this constraint for




[(1 ￿ ￿)￿q￿Q ￿ c]
c=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿q￿Q
(qH + qL)￿q
Note that ￿2 is decreasing in ￿. Hence, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 For ￿ < ^ ￿ we have: For ￿ ￿ ￿1 and ￿ ￿ ￿2 the JPE wage
scheme given by (16) is implementable and uniquely optimal. As the share
of values (￿) that the agents can hold-up ex post increases, the scheme ap-
proaches an IPE scheme.
For given ￿ ￿ ￿1 and for discount factors smaller than the critical fac-
tor ￿2, the scheme (16) will no longer be implementable. For ￿ = ￿2 the
dynamic enforceability constraint for the principal (EP) is binding for ￿HH
(and only for this bonus), while the agent￿ s constraint EA is binding for the
other bonuses. The least costly way for the principal to adapt to a lower ￿
(and hence a stricter EP) will then be to reduce ￿HH, and by that reduce
the di⁄erence ￿HH ￿ ￿HL. Note as well that a lower ￿ will also increase
￿LH;￿LL;￿HL when EA binds, see (16). Thus, a lower ￿ will force the princi-
pal to modify the scheme towards an IPE scheme. To sum up: the possibility
for the agents to hold-up values forces the principal to o⁄er a greater extent
of individualized incentives at the expense of team incentives, even when the
agents￿tasks are perfect complements
So far we have only analyzed the case of a ￿ small￿common shock; ￿ < ^ ￿.
The case ￿ > ^ ￿ can be analyzed similarly. (Note that this case is only relevant
if qH+qL < 1, since otherwise ^ ￿ ￿ 1.) The reasoning leading to Lemma 1 and
the discussion following Figure 2 indicates that for ￿ exceeding some lower
bound the minimal cost contract will be a modi￿ed RPE contract, graphically
given by the south-east intersection of EA￿and IC in Figure 2. This can be
veri￿ed formally, and it can also be veri￿ed that this contract will satisfy EP
and hence be fully implementable when ￿ exceeds some critical value ￿
0
2 < 1
(cfr Proposition 3). Moreover, as ￿ increases the contract will move towards
an IPE contract.15 Formal proofs of these assertions are available from the
authors.
15In the case ￿ > ^ ￿ considered here, it turns out that the least-cost contract is not
204.2 Peer pressure
A more striking demonstration of the JPE hold-up problem can be made in a
setting with peer pressure. In order to highlight the e⁄ects of this feature, we
return to the case of stochastic and technological independence, i.e. ￿ = 0
and qHL = qH, as assumed in Section 3. To model peer pressure in this
framework, we assume that there are costs associated with lowering the peer￿ s
wage by realizing low output, i.e. that agents experience disutility from being
the ￿ weakest link￿ . Such an event will occur with probability (1 ￿ qH)qH if
￿HH > ￿HL. We represent this disutility by d = maxf￿(￿HH ￿ ￿HL);0g,
where ￿ is a cost parameter.
This assumption is in some sense in the spirit of Kandel and Lazear
(1992). They distinguish between internal peer pressure, or guilt, when e⁄ort
is unobservable among the agents, and external pressure, or shame, when
e⁄ort is observable. In our model, e⁄ort is unobservable, so our assumption
can be interpreted as guilt. However, output is observable, so the weakest link
e⁄ect can also be interpreted as shame. A point here is that our assumption
is not directly related to the disutility from low e⁄ort. It is output that
matters. Low e⁄ort gives no disutility if it leads to high output (which it
does with probability qL.) And high e⁄ort may induce disutility if it leads
to low output. The shame interpretation is therefore most appropriate.
Let D denote the expected disutility associated with being the weakest
link:
D = (1 ￿ qH)qHd = (1 ￿ qH)qH maxf￿(￿HH ￿ ￿HL);0g
In a high e⁄ort equilibrium, each agent￿ s expected utility is now
￿ ￿ D ￿ c = qH [qH￿HH + (1 ￿ qH)￿HL]
+(1 ￿ qH)[qH(￿LH ￿ d) + (1 ￿ qH)￿LL] ￿ c
where ￿ = ￿(H;H;￿). This yields an IC constraint just as (IC) in Section
3, except that ￿LH is replaced by ￿LH ￿ d. From this constraint and the
de￿nition of ￿ we then obtain





+ qH(￿LH ￿ d) + (1 ￿ qH)￿LL
￿
+ (1 ￿ qH)[qH￿LH + (1 ￿ qH)￿LL]
unique, as there is some leeway in specifying the bonuses ￿HL and ￿LH. The modi￿ed
RPE contract is one optimal contract, and any optimal contract moves towards an IPE
contract when ￿ increases.






H maxf￿(￿HH ￿ ￿HL);0g + qH￿LH + (1 ￿ qH)￿LL (17)
Ignoring enforceability constraints for the moment, we now see that if
￿ > 0, the least costly contract has ￿HL = ￿LH = ￿LL = 0 and ￿HH =
c
qH￿q(1+￿). (The latter value follows from the IC constraint, which for a
contract (￿HH;0;0;0) here requires qH￿HH ￿qH(￿d) ￿ c
￿q.) The associated




￿+1. We see that this wage cost is decreasing
in v, and hence lower than the cost for the case ￿ = 0. This shows that, by
o⁄ering incentives based on JPE, the principal can exploit the disutility e⁄ect
of being the weakest link.




￿+1 is achievable if output is veri￿able,
or if the enforceability constraints (EA and EP) do not bind.16 Interestingly,
we will now see that once the agent￿ s enforceability constraints bind for low
output (￿LL and ￿LH), which will occur for ￿ above some threshold, then the
optimal scheme is not only a less stark JPE scheme; it is a pure IPE scheme.
In fact, any JPE contract is then dominated by this IPE scheme.
The dynamic enforceability constraint EA for the agents here takes the
form
minf￿HH ￿ ￿QH;￿HL ￿ ￿QH;￿LH ￿ d ￿ ￿QL;￿LL ￿ ￿QLg ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
[E(s) ￿ ￿ + D + c]
Using (17), which follows from the present IC-constraint, and EA for











[E(s) ￿ ￿ + D + c] + qHd
￿
Note that ￿q2
Hd + qHd = D. Collecting terms involving ￿ ￿ D and











We see that to minimize ￿, the principal will want to set D as small as
possible i.e. make d = maxf￿(￿HH ￿ ￿HL);0g as small as possible. This
means setting ￿HH ￿￿HL = 0, provided this is feasible by EP. It follows that
16It can be checked that for ￿ and ￿ su¢ ciently small and for ￿ su¢ ciently large this
least cost contract is implementable even if output is non-veri￿able.
22the IPE wage scheme together with the feasible RPE schemes satisfying the
IC constraint with equality, are optimal once the enforceability conditions
EA bind for low outputs (bonuses ￿LH and ￿LL).






for all ￿ < 1, and so EA will indeed bind at outcomes LL and LH. Provided
￿HH ￿ ￿HL = 0 is feasible (EP is satis￿ed), then EA￿and IC￿will hold. EP
will be satis￿ed for this solution if EP￿holds for ￿HH = ￿HL, which is the
case if 2(￿HH ￿ ￿LH ￿ ￿￿Q) ￿ 2￿
1￿￿ [￿q￿Q ￿ c]. From EA￿and IC￿we see
that this holds if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ given by






For ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ an IPE wage scheme (￿HH = ￿HL) is thus optimal.17 We have the
following result:
Proposition 4 When there is peer pressure (￿ > 0) and agent hold-up (￿ ￿
￿0) we have: For ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ an IPE wage scheme (with ￿HH = ￿HL) satisfying
(10), IC and EA￿is feasible and optimal. The minimal wage cost is ￿min given
in (8). Any wage scheme with ￿HH ￿ ￿HL > 0 yields a strictly larger cost,
thus any JPE scheme is strictly inferior to IPE (and feasible RPE schemes).
The intuition for this result goes as follows: If the agents can renegotiate
a spot price, they are able to avoid the disutility e⁄ects from peer pressure,
since a spot price is equivalent to an IPE scheme. In order to implement
JPE, the principal then has to compensate the agents for the peer pressure
e⁄ect. But then JPE becomes more expensive than IPE or RPE, where no
such e⁄ects exist. In other words: once the spot price becomes su¢ ciently
tempting, the principal can no longer use JPE to exploit the e⁄ects of peer
pressure, but has to compensate the agents for any disutility e⁄ects that
team incentives provide.
5 Concluding remarks
In an interesting review of the history of employment relationships, Peter
Cappelli (2000) argues that the last twenty years have seen a dramatic shift
from traditional bureaucratic employment structures to ￿ inside contracting
17It can be seen that for su¢ ciently low discount factors the ￿ commitment advantage￿
of RPE dominates the peer-dependence e⁄ect, making RPE optimal. The commitment
advantage of RPE (with no agent hold-up) is analyzed in Kvalły and Olsen (2006).
23systems (...) shaped by individualized incentives and pressures from outside
labor markets. Along the same lines, Levin and Tadelis (2005) argue that
greater competition in the labour market and changes in market information
has made it less valuable to commit to the pro￿t sharing plans of professional
partnerships.
In this paper we o⁄er a model that elucidates these developments. We
have shown that compensation tied to peer performance can induce employee
hold-up and obstruct the implementation of relational incentive contracts.
The model presented may thus explain the tendency to use individual per-
formance pay in human-capital-intensive industries. Tremblay and Chenevert
(2004) and Appelbaum (1991) note that even if knowledge-based industries
are characterized by teamwork, the challenge to retain the most critical re-
sources increases the pertinence of rewarding individual performance. Our
model supports this conjecture.
In addition, the model can contribute to explain why relative performance
evaluation is used less in CEO compensation than agency theory suggests.18
Even though our model has a multilateral feature, i.e. one principal con-
tracting with two agents, what drives our result is the agents￿temptations
to renegotiate when not being paid according to absolute output. A CEO
interpretation is therefore not unreasonable since they are in the position
of holding up values ex post if not being paid a ￿ fair share￿of their value
added.
There is a large literature discussing human capital and problems of
expropriation in modern corporations. Recent papers include Kessler and
L￿lfesmann (2006) who show how the ￿rm can balance incentive provision
between general and ￿rm speci￿c investments in human capital in order to
mitigate the hold-up problem; and Rajan and Zingales (2001) who argue
that human-capital-intensive industries will develop ￿ at organizations with
distinctive technologies and cultures in order to avoid expropriation. We
complement this literature by showing how indispensable human capital af-
fects the ￿rm￿ s feasible incentive design.
18See Murphy (1999) who states that ￿ the paucity of RPE in options and other compo-
nents of executive compensation remains a puzzle worth understanding￿ . See also Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999).
24Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider ￿rst the principal￿ s enforceability constraint EP. The constraint
binds when ￿kl+￿lk￿￿(Qk+Ql) is maximal. We can thus write the constraint
as




[￿q￿Q + E(s) ￿ ￿(H;H;￿)] (EP)
When the EA constraints are binding for ￿LH and ￿LL, we have ￿LH =
￿LL = ￿
1￿￿ [E(s) ￿ ￿(H;H;￿) + c]. Subtracting 2￿LL ￿ 2￿QL on both sides
then yields (recalling ￿LH = ￿LL):




We see that this is equivalent to the condition EP￿given in the text, because
the EA constraints for ￿HH and ￿HL are here equivalent to ￿Hl￿￿Ll￿￿￿Q ￿
0, l = H;L.
Consider now statement (i) in Proposition 1. It follows from the geometry
of Figure 1 that the minimal discount factor ￿ = b ￿ for which a bonus scheme
satisfying IC and EA￿also satis￿es EP￿is obtained when the kink of the EP￿
curve in Figure 1 is positioned on IC, i.e. when EP￿ , IC and 2(￿HH ￿￿LH ￿
￿￿Q) = ￿HL ￿ ￿LL ￿ ￿￿Q hold jointly. The last two conditions yield
qH(￿HH ￿ ￿LH) + (1 ￿ qH)(2(￿HH ￿ ￿LH) ￿ ￿￿Q) =
c
￿q
and hence (2 ￿ qH)(￿HH ￿ ￿LH) = c
￿q + (1 ￿ qH)￿￿Q. Inserting this in EP￿











This coincides with (11), and hence proves statement (i).
It remains to prove statement (ii). By de￿nition of ^ ￿ no wage scheme can
satisfy IC and EP￿for ￿ < ^ ￿. The statement then follows when we show that
EP￿is a necessary condition for implementability. To prove this, ￿rst note
that EA implies
25￿Lj ￿ ￿QL ￿ ￿
1￿￿ [E(s) ￿ ￿ + c], j = H;L, (￿ = ￿(H;H;￿)).
Condition EP implies
2(￿HH ￿ ￿LH ￿ ￿￿Q) + 2(￿LH ￿ ￿QL) = 2(￿HH ￿ ￿QH)
￿ 2￿
1￿￿ [￿q￿Q ￿ ￿ + E(s)]
and
(￿HL ￿ ￿LL ￿ ￿￿Q) + (￿LH ￿ ￿QL) + (￿LL ￿ ￿QL)
= (￿HL + ￿LH ￿ ￿QH ￿ ￿QL)
￿ 2￿
1￿￿ [￿q￿Q ￿ ￿ + E(s)]
Using these three inequalities we see that EP￿follows. This completes the
proof.
Remark Proposition 1
We here verify the statements made in the remark to Proposition 1. For
any contract ￿ with ￿LH = ￿LL we have ￿(￿;￿;￿) = q￿ [q￿￿HH + (1 ￿ q￿)￿HL]+
(1 ￿ q￿)￿LL and hence
￿(H;H;￿) ￿ ￿(H;L;￿) + ￿(L;L;￿) ￿ ￿(L;H;￿)
= qH ([qH￿HH + (1 ￿ qH)￿HL] ￿ [qL￿HH + (1 ￿ qL)￿HL])
+qL ([qL￿HH + (1 ￿ qL)￿HL] ￿ [qH￿HH + (1 ￿ qH)￿HL])
= (qH ￿ qL)2 (￿HH ￿ ￿HL)
When IC binds (￿(H;H;￿) ￿ c = ￿(L;H;￿)) we thus have
￿(L;L;￿) ￿ (￿(H;L;￿) ￿ c) = (qH ￿ qL)2 (￿HH ￿ ￿HL)
This is negative for RPE contracts, hence e⁄orts HH is then a unique equi-
librium for the given contract. The expression is however non-negative for
JPE or IPE contracts, hence e⁄orts LL is then another equilibrium.
Next compare equilibrium payo⁄s. Note that for ￿LH = ￿LL we have
￿(L;L;￿)￿￿(L;H;￿) = qL ([qL￿HH + (1 ￿ qL)￿HL] ￿ [qH￿HH + (1 ￿ qH)￿HL])
= ￿qL(qH ￿ qL)(￿HH ￿ ￿HL)
Hence for a JPE or IPE contract with IC binding we have
￿(L;L;￿) ￿ ￿(L;H;￿) = ￿(H;H;￿) ￿ c
with strict inequality for JPE. Thus the HH equilibrium yields a higher payo⁄
than the LL equilibrium, and strictly so for a JPE contract.
Veri￿cation of (12 - 13).
We verify here that (12 - 13) hold for the schemes stated in Proposition
1 when ￿ ￿ ^ ￿. We have




￿q + ￿QL ￿ ￿( c
￿q ￿ ￿￿Q)qL
￿
￿ ￿(QL + ￿QqL)
= qL
c
￿q + c ￿ ￿( c
￿q ￿ ￿￿Q)qL ￿ ￿￿QqL
= (1 ￿ ￿)( c
￿q ￿ ￿￿Q)qL + c
This shows that ￿ ￿ E(s) > c, hence (12) holds. We further have




c￿￿￿Q￿q￿q(2 ￿ qH)( c
￿q ￿ ￿￿Q)qL
= ^ ￿ [￿q￿Q ￿ c](2 ￿ qH)qL < [￿q￿Q ￿ c]
where the last inequality follows from ^ ￿ < 1 and (2￿qH)qL < (2￿qH)qH < 1.
Hence we see that (13) holds.
Veri￿cation of (14 - 15).
Substituting from ￿HH from (ICt) in the expression for ￿ = ￿(H;H;￿)
yields
￿ ￿










qH(1 ￿ qH)(￿HL + ￿LH) + (1 ￿ qH)
2￿LL
￿






￿ ￿ ￿J +
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)qH(1 ￿ qH) ￿
￿


























￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)qH ￿







1 ￿ 2￿ ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)qH + 2










Substituting then from EA for ￿HL;￿LH;￿LL in (14) we get








(E(s) ￿ (￿ ￿ c))
￿
Collecting terms involving ￿ and substituting for E(s) = ￿(QL+(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)qL)￿Q)
then yields

















(￿J ￿ c) +
p
2





￿￿Q + ￿QL ￿ ￿
￿

























(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)qL)￿
p
2
= (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)qL)￿
qHqL ￿ ￿(1 ￿ qH)(1 ￿ qL)
qH + qL
=




￿ ￿ ￿J +
p
2
￿￿Q + ￿QL ￿ ￿
￿
c
￿q (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿￿Q
￿




Proof of Lemma 1
Note ￿rst that ￿1￿q￿Q(1 ￿ ￿) < c for QL > 0, hence (4) is satis￿ed.
The derivation of (15) shows that for ￿ ￿ ￿1 the minimal wage cost is given
by ￿m(￿;￿), and that the minimum is attained when IC binds and EA binds
for ￿HL;￿LH;￿LL.
To verify the expression for ￿LL note that (14) may be written as ￿ ￿
￿J +
p
2((￿HL￿￿LL)+(￿LH ￿￿LL))+￿LL. When EA binds for ￿HL;￿LH;￿LL
the RHS equals ￿m(￿;￿), and we thus have ￿m(￿;￿) = ￿J+
p
2￿￿Q+￿LL. This
yields the stated expression for ￿LL. Next, substituting for ￿LH = ￿LL =
￿HL￿￿￿Q in (ICt) and solving this for ￿HH when the constraint binds then
yields the stated expression for ￿HH. To see this, note that the substitution
yields
[qH + qL]￿HH+[1 ￿ qH ￿ qL](2￿HL￿￿￿Q)￿[2 ￿ qH ￿ qL](￿HL￿￿￿Q) =
c
(1 ￿ ￿)￿q
Solving this for ￿HH yields the stated expression.
Remark to Lemma 1
We here verify the statements made in the remark to Lemma 1. From the
assumption of perfect complementarity we have now ￿(H;L;￿) = ￿(L;L;￿) =
￿(L;H;￿), and for a contract with ￿LH = ￿LL we have then
￿￿ ￿ f￿(H;H;￿) ￿ ￿(H;L;￿) + ￿(L;L;￿) ￿ ￿(L;H;￿)g=(1 ￿ ￿)
= qH [qH￿HH + (1 ￿ qH)￿HL] + (1 ￿ qH)￿LL
￿qL [qL￿HH + (1 ￿ qL)￿HL] ￿ (1 ￿ qL)￿LL
= (qH ￿ qL)2 (￿HH ￿ ￿HL) + (qH ￿ qL)(￿HL ￿ ￿LL)
The expression is positive for the JPE contract given in Lemma 1. When
IC binds (￿(H;H;￿) ￿ c = ￿(L;H;￿)) we thus have
￿(L;L;￿) ￿ (￿(H;L;￿) ￿ c) = ￿￿ > 0,
hence e⁄orts LL is then another equilibrium.
28Comparing equilibrium payo⁄s, we have ￿(L;L;￿) = ￿(L;H;￿) by per-
fect complementarity and ￿(L;H;￿) = ￿(H;H;￿)￿c when IC binds. Hence
￿(L;L;￿) = ￿(H;H;￿)￿c for the contract given in Lemma 1. The two e⁄ort
equilibria thus yield equal payo⁄s. (We may note that with less than perfect
complementarity; qH > qHL > qL, we would have ￿(L;L;￿) < ￿(L;H;￿)
and ￿￿ > 0 for the optimal JPE contract, and hence a strictly higher payo⁄
for e⁄orts HH than for e⁄orts LL.)
Proof of Proposition 3
We must show that the bonuses given by (16) satisfy EP for ￿ ￿ ￿2. These
bonuses satisfy ￿HH > ￿HL = ￿LL + ￿￿Q and ￿LH = ￿LL. This implies
2￿HH ￿2￿QH > 2￿HL ￿2￿QH = ￿HL +￿LH ￿￿(QH +QL) = 2￿LL ￿2￿QL.
We moreover have from EA ￿
1￿￿ (E(s) ￿ ￿(H;H;￿) + c) = ￿LL ￿ ￿QL. So
EP is here
￿HH ￿ ￿QH ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
[(1 ￿ ￿)￿q￿Q ￿ c] + ￿LL ￿ ￿QL









[(1 ￿ ￿)￿q￿Q ￿ c]
We see that ￿2 is de￿ned as the minimal ￿ satisfying this inequality. This
completes the proof.
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